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Abstract
This article addresses the question of how the Crimean case relates to Russia’s general 
understanding of territorial questions and border regimes. We examine the histori-
cal evolution of Russian discourse on borders and territorial questions and investigate 
to what extent they can explain Russia’s decision to annex Crimea. We will look into 
the principles of inviolability of borders and territorial integrity that sustain the status 
quo, and how this has been challenged by three partly interlinked doctrines: national 
self-determination, geopolitics, and historical rights. We argue that the discourse on 
territorial integrity and the status quo has predominated in Russia since the Cold War, 
and that this has not changed fundamentally, either before or after the annexation of 
Crimea. Russia does not seem to want to abolish the existing norms altogether or to 
advocate any clearly articulated reformist agenda. Rather, it picks and chooses argu-
ments on an ad hoc basis, imitating Western positions in some other cases when de-
parting from the basic norm of the status quo. Hence, we claim that Russia’s territorial 
revisionism is reactive, self-serving, and constrained by the desire to avoid changing 
the status quo doctrine to any great extent.
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1 Introduction
Russia’s annexation of Crimea (or the unification of Crimea with Russia as the 
Russians prefer to call it) in March 2014 can be seen as a turning point not only 
in Russia’s relations with the West but also in Russia’s own policy with regard 
to international borders. After a long era of status quo maintenance since the 
end of the Second World War, Crimea was the first case of direct annexation 
(although technically it can be seen as consisting of a secession first and then 
a merger) and it has therefore challenged the existing border regime based 
on status quo much more radically than the earlier cases. Russia is under the 
loupe here, since a country’s policy towards territorial questions and border 
regimes has always been the ultimate litmus test of whether the country in 
question is regarded as a norm-abiding member of the international commu-
nity. As Dmitri Trenin has argued, “Russia’s attitude towards borders, no less 
than anything else, will help define its identity, role in the world and relations 
with neighbours”.1
This article addresses the question of how the Crimean case relates to gen-
eral Russian understanding of territorial questions and border regimes. Does it 
represent a shift in the way Russian thinking about legitimate territorial chang-
es, or is it an exception that Russia cannot support by consistent normative 
rhetoric? Is there a more long-term pattern of normative argumentation that 
backs up Russian politics? The point here is not the perspective of interna-
tional law and legality as such, but rather the larger political discourse dealing 
with territorial norms and border regimes. It is important to think how public 
discourses of borders and territorial questions are related – and perhaps partly 
even explain – Russia’s decision to annex Crimea, or whether such discourses 
and actual political decisions are only loosely connected.2
Although the Crimean case has been widely covered, there is relatively little 
previous research examining the evolution and structure of Russian discourse 
on territorial and border issues in general. The received wisdom is that geopo-
litical discourse gained prominence in Russia as a result of the identity crisis 
1 Dmitri Trenin, The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border between Geopolitics and Globaliza-
tion (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for Peace, 2002), 18.
2 On Russian legal interpretations, see Christer Pursiainen and Tuomas Forsberg, ‘The Prin-
ciple of Territorial Integrity in Russian International Law Doctrine: The Case of Crimea’, in 
P. Sean Morris (ed.), Russian Discourses on International Law: Sociological and Philosophical 
Phenomenon (Routledge: Abingdon 2019), 220–241.
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caused by the break-up of the Soviet Union.3 The role of geopolitical identity 
discourses has been regarded as central to the background of the Ukraine crisis 
and the annexation of Crimea. Hopf argues that the evolution of the discours-
es on Russian national identity explains how the annexation of Crimea and 
Russia’s military intervention became thinkable and natural by 2014.4 What is 
lacking, however, is a more systematic understanding of the evolution of nor-
mative discourses justifying territorial changes.
There are three different basic accounts of the way in which Russian views 
on territorial norms and principles can be characterized: realpolitik (instru-
mentalist), restorative (status quo) and reformist (revisionist).5 According to 
the realpolitik account, Russia’s policy is neo-imperial and geared toward ter-
ritorial expansionism whenever it has power to do so.6 Territorial claims are 
not necessarily related to public discourse at all, since the tendency is seen as 
innate in the Russian state structures, political culture, geopolitical laws, or 
even dna.7 Indeed, if Russia is a neo-imperial power intent upon territorial 
enlargement, all normative argumentation is simply a pretext for self-interest. 
Adherence to territorial norms is temporary at best and instrumental during 
times when Russia is weak. For example, Becker, Cohen, Kushi and McManus 
claim that Russia has been reluctant to accept political institutions established 
by Western powers when it was weak and is now keen to overthrow the status 
quo in favor of a new world order more conducive to Russia’s rising interna-
tional status.8
3 Edith Clowes, Russia on the Edge: Imagined Geographies and Post-Soviet Identity (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2011); Alexander Astrov and Natalia Morozova, ‘Russia: Geopoli-
tics from the Heartland’, in Stefano Guzzini (ed.), The Return of Geopolitics in Europe? Social 
Mechanisms and Foreign Policy Identity Crisis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 
192–216.
4 Ted Hopf,‘“Crimea is Ours”: A Discursive History’, International Relations 30 no. 2 (2016), 
227–255.
5 Roy Allison, ‘Russia and the post-2014 International Legal Order: Revisionism and Realpoli-
tik’, International Affairs 93 no. 3 (2017), 519–543.
6 See, for example, Agnia Grigas, Beyond Crimea: The New Russian Empire (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2016) and Ostap Kushnir, Ukraine and Russian Neo-Imperialism: The Diver-
gent Break (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2018).
7 See, for example, Andrei Tsygankov, Russophobia: Anti-Russian Lobby and American Foreign 
Policy (New York: Palgrave, 2009).
8 Michael E. Becker, Matthem S. Cohen, Sidita Kushi and Ian P. McManus, ‘Reviving the 
 Russian Empire: the Crimean Intervention through a Neoclassical Realist Lens’, European 
Security, 25 no. 1 (2015), 112–133.
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The opposing view is restorative and holds that Russia has been a status quo 
power with regard to borders. It claims that the prominent Russian political 
and legal discourse has supported state sovereignty and the principle of the in-
violability of borders. From this perspective, Russian behavior in Ukraine and 
Georgia is reactive and defensive in nature, and ultimately aims at defending 
the existing norms. For Sakwa “the essence of [Russian] neo-revisionism is not 
the attempt to create new rules or to advance an alternative model of interna-
tional order but to ensure the universal and consistent application of existing 
norms”.9
The third option – that Russia is a reformist power with a consistent scheme 
for a new territorial regime – has been largely absent. It is difficult to find an ar-
ticulated position of a set of alternative rules beyond the former Soviet Union. 
Yet, Konyshev and Sergunin have argued that “Russia is neither a status quo 
state aiming to preserve the main rules of the international system nor a re-
visionist state that aspires to radically change those rules”.10 In other words, 
 Russia is a reformist state which is unsatisfied with the existing rules of the 
‘game’ but does not want to change them too much.
We will argue that the discourse sustaining the territorial integrity of states 
and the status quo of existing borders has predominated in Russia since the 
Cold War, and that this has not changed fundamentally either before or af-
ter the annexation of Crimea. The Crimean case, however, highlighted three 
partly interlinked challenging doctrines: national self-determination, strategic 
needs based on geopolitics, and historical rights. In addition to the Ukrainian 
crisis, the cases of South Ossetia and Abkhazia famously demonstrated the as-
cendancy of the self-determination discourse in Russia. In addition, historical 
rights and geopolitical arguments to justify Russia’s right/duty to expand its 
borders and foster post-Soviet integration have been part of the Russian dis-
course justifying border changes. All these justifications have, however, been 
selectively employed and have not superseded the principle of status quo as 
the basic discourse. Indeed, Russia does not seem to advocate any clearly ar-
ticulated reformist agenda, but its leaders and other representatives pick and 
choose arguments on an ad hoc basis when departing from the basic norms 
of territorial integrity and the status quo. We claim that Russia’s territorial 
9 Richard Sakwa, Russia against the Rest: The Post-Cold War Crisis of World Order (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 131. See also, Richard Sakwa, ‘Russian Neo- 
Revisionism’, Russian Politics 4, no. 1, (2019): 1–21.
10 Valery Konyshev and Alexander Sergunin, ‘Russian Views on the Ukraine’s Crisis’, Valdai 
Discussion Club (2014), available at: {http://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/russian_views 
_on_the_ukraine_s_crisis/}, accessed 31 January 2019.
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 revisionism is reactive, self-serving, and constrained by the desire to avoid 
changing the status quo doctrine to any great extent.
2 Russia’s Discourse on Border Regimes and Principles
The existing international border regime is based on the status quo: state bor-
ders should not be changed. In Europe, this was confirmed in the 1975 osce 
declaration which, however, left the back door open to peaceful territorial 
changes based on mutual consent. Nevertheless, the declaration implied a ban 
on territorial claims, upon which negotiations on peaceful territorial changes 
could have been based. The end of the Cold War brought well-known changes 
to the European territorial order. Germany was unified and three states: the 
 Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia were dissolved. Out of these cas-
es, Yugoslavia was the most problematic because the dissolution was not based 
on the agreement of the dissolving units and led to diverging policies of rec-
ognition. The international community nevertheless established a principle, 
according to which entities of a federal state can be recognized as independent 
states within their previous administrative borders if they fulfill certain condi-
tions of statehood and democracy. The Kosovars’ case stressed that minorities 
have a right to self-determination if their rights are suppressed by the state, 
and the recognition could be seen as a way to stabilize the political situation. 
This principle was, however, vaguely formulated and it was ultimately based 
on political decisions and state practice on the bases of which the new norms 
were constructed.11
The post-Cold War territorial norms regarding secession and state recogni-
tion were therefore ambiguous and contested particularly as far as dissolving 
federal states were concerned. Some scholars, such as Eiki Berg and Martin 
Molder have argued that “blurring is the new norm”.12 There is no codified 
right to secede, but a number of new states have been recognized against the 
opinion of the parent state. Yet, blurring is relative. Although there remains a 
margin of normative and factual interpretation concerning each case, there 
has been no intention to erode the existing border regime and to destabilise 
11 Peter Radan, The Break-up of Yugoslavia and International Law (London: Routledge, 2002) 
and Marko Milanovic and Michael Wood (eds), The Law and Politics of the Kosovo Advisory 
Opinion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).
12 Eiki Berg and Martin Mölder, ‘When “Blurring” Becomes the Norm and Secession is Justi-
fied as the Exception: Revisiting EU and Russian Discourses in the Common Neighbour-
hood’, Journal of International Relations and Development, 17 no. 4 (2014), 469–488.
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the existing territorial order by the majority of the states and the international 
community. In particular, direct annexation and changes of state borders be-
tween existing states without mutual consent – not to mention by the use of 
force or with the threat of it – are categorically excluded.
Of course, status quo – no changes in borders – does not need to be the only 
possible or justifiable form of a border regime. Typically, status quo thinking 
is supported by those states who have no territorial claims but are satisfied 
with the existing borders. Territorial claims and peaceful change of  borders 
can be justified by various arguments: most typical are those of national 
self- determination, historic rights, and various geopolitical reasons based on 
defensive needs, natural borders or pure power political logic, which can be 
turned into a normative justification in terms strategic needs of great or rising 
powers.13 All these types of arguments come in the different forms. In the case 
of national self-determination, the critical question is “what is the nation?” 
and who is the agent that determines its boundaries? With regard to historic 
rights, the key question is whether historical ownership as such matters, or 
whether the point is an illegal transfer that took place in the past. The geo-
political arguments that are based either on the view of the organic growth 
of states and thus some natural, legitimate rights of rising powers or on some 
idea of natural geographical barriers as borders, in turn, cannot be based on an 
undisputed view of what “natural” in these cases means.
The annexation of Crimea sparked a huge body of literature dealing with 
the decision, its motivation, its justification, and its significance to Russia’s 
identity, foreign policy, and the international system.14 Focusing on the official 
13 See, Tuomas Forsberg, ‘Territorial Disputes and the Possibility of Peaceful Change’, in 
Heikki Patomäki (ed.), Peaceful Changes in World Politics (Tampere: Tampere Peace Re-
search Institute, 1995), 122–167. and for example, Norman Hill, Claims to Territory in Inter-
national Law and Relations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1945).
14 Brad Simpson, ‘Self-Determination in the Age of Putin’, Foreign Policy Online (March 21 
2014), available at: {http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/03/21/self-determination-in-the-age-of 
-putin/}, accessed 31 January 2019; Igor Zevelev, ‘The Russian World Boundaries. Russia’s 
National Identity Transformation and New Foreign Policy Doctrine’, Russia in Global Af-
fairs, no. 2 (2014), available at: {http://www.globalaffairs.ru/number/The-Russian-World 
-Boundaries-16707}, accessed 31 January 2019; Mikhail Deliagin, ‘Crimea’, Russian Politics 
& Law, 53, no. 2 (2015), 6–31; Flemming Splidsboel Hansen, ‘Framing Yourself into a Cor-
ner: Russia, Crimea, and the Minimal Action Space’, European Security, 24, no. 1 (2015), 
141–158; Marlene Laruelle, ‘Russia as a “Divided Nation,” from Compatriots to Crimea: A 
Contribution to the Discussion on Nationalism and Foreign Policy’, Problems of Post-Com-
munism, 62, no. 2 (2015), 88–97; Mariya Omelicheva, ‘Critical Geopolitics on Russian For-
eign Policy: Uncovering the Imagery of Moscow’s International Relations’, International 
Politics, 53 no. 6 (2016), 708–726; Magdalena Leichtova, ‘Why Crimea was Always Ours: 
Legitimacy Building in Russia in the Wake of the Crisis in Ukraine and the Annexation of 
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identity discourse, Teper argued that the goal was to reunify the Russian na-
tion and, in this light, the main legitimization for annexation of Crimea was 
‘the realization of bilateral popular will’.15 The official discourse had become 
more nationalist rather than statist, but Vladimir Putin’s rhetoric nevertheless 
denied imperial ambitions.16 Biersack and Lear for their part argued that an-
nexation of Crimea was justified by three main narratives: that Crimea histori-
cally and culturally belonged to Russia, the need to protect Russian-speakers 
or Russians in Crimea against “fascist junta” in Kiev, and the Crimeans’ right to 
self-determination.17 Becker, Cohen, Kushi, and McManus distinguish between 
three different kinds of normative discourse to justify annexation: nationalis-
tic view of uniting Russian-speakers, the geopolitical need to resist nato and 
EU enlargements, and the liberal concepts of responsibility to protect and 
right to self-determination.18 Yet, they do not think that any of them was the 
real reason for the annexation of Crimea. They claim that the Kremlin was not 
sincere in its normative rhetoric but instead driven by national interests and 
the traditional realist motivations of security through increased state capabili-
ties. Biersack and Lear also argue that strategic objectives of the “status of the 
Black Sea Fleet and the energy geopolitics in the Black Sea were more obvious 
motivations than norms”.19
Our aim here is not to compare Russian justifications for border changes 
to other alleged reasons for the annexation. Rather we want to examine the 
discursive background of these justifications, their coherence and compatibil-
ity. The question is not whether the justifications were in line with existing 
 international law – as most clearly they were not,20 or whether the facts given 
Crimea’, Russian Politics, 1 no. 2 (2016), 291–315; Gerard Toal, Near Abroad: Putin, the West 
and the Contest over Ukraine and the Caucasus (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017); 
Paul B. Richardson, ‘Geopolitical Cultures, Pragmatic Patriotism, and Russia’s Disputed 
Islands’, Eurasian Geography and Economics, 59 no. 1 (2018), 7–27.
15 Yuri Teper, ‘Official Russian Identity Discourse in Light of the Annexation of Crimea: Na-
tional or Imperial?’, Post-Soviet Affairs, 32 no. 4 (2015), 378–396.
16 See also, Andrei Tsygankov, ‘Vladimir Putin’s Last Stand: the Sources of Russia’s Ukraine 
Policy’, Post-Soviet Affairs, 31 no. 4 (2015), 279–303.
17 John Biersack, and Shannon O´Lear, ‘The Geopolitics of Russia’s Annexation of Crimea: 
Narratives, Identity, Silences, and Energy’, Eurasian Geography and Economics, 55 no. 3 
(2014), pp. 247–269.
18 Becker et al, ‘Reviving the Russian Empire’.
19 Biersack and O´Lear, ‘The Geopolitics of Russia’s Annexation of Crimea’.
20 See, for example, William H. Burke-White, ‘Crimea and the International Legal Order’, 
Survival 56, no. 4 (2014), 65–80; Thomas Grant, Aggression against Ukraine: International 
Law (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); Allison, ‘Russia and the post-2014 Internation-
al Legal Order’; see also Lauri Mälksoo, Russian Approaches to International Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2015).
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in support of these justifications were correct – but about the nature and the 
evolution of the discourse including its argumentative coherence.21 Although 
discourses on borders may contain many statements related to their purpose 
and functions,22 we focus on normative arguments. Moreover, we try to look at 
the question of to what extent the Russian discourse on the territorial norms 
can explain the annexation of Crimea. The causal impact of discourses is a 
contested issue and cannot be proven directly on the basis of mere congru-
ence.23 Yet, we can discern two basic variants of the role of discourses for pol-
icy. First is the weak claim that discourses enable political action by making 
some policy choices thinkable. Second is the claim that policies, in this case 
annexation of Crimea, are pushed forward, if not determined, by the main-
stream discourse. In between these two is the idea that adopted policies need 
to be compatible with political discourses.24
When looking at the Russian discourse concerning the border regime and 
principles that sustain or challenge it, we focus on the political elite including 
politicians, diplomats, “political technologists” and other opinion makers. Pop-
ular discourses can differ from these and can limit the significance of the elite 
discourses in practice,25 but we will not examine them in any systematic man-
ner here. Instead we have gone through key speeches and interviews of the 
President, and gathered materials from Russian policy journals dealing with 
international affairs such as Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn’ and Russia in Global Af-
fairs from 1992 to 2015. In addition, we rely on other media sources (newspa-
pers, journals, radio interviews) and have utilized the Integrum database for 
part of the materials.
We have employed qualitative content analysis as the method of analysis. 
After preliminary screening of the materials, we distinguished between four 
21 On discourses of justification, see e.g. Uriel Abulof and Markus Kornprobst, ‘Introduc-
tion: The Politics of Public Justification’, Contemporary Politics 23, no. 1 (2017), 1–18.
22 See e.g. Vladimir Kolosov, Olga Vendina, Anton Gritsenko, Maria Zotova, Fedor Popov and 
Alexander Sebentsov, ‘Looking East and West: the Shifting Concepts of Russia’s Borders 
with cis Countries and the EU’, in Jussi Laine, Ilkka Liikanen and James W. Scott (eds) 
Post-Cold War Borders Reframing Political Space in Eastern Europe (Abingdon: Routledge 
2019), 72–90.
23 Benjamin Banta, ‘Analysing Discourse as a Causal Mechanism’, European Journal of Inter-
national Relations, 19 no. 2 (2012), 379–402.
24 See Ole Waever, ‘Identity, Communities and Foreign Policy: Discourse Analysis as Foreign 
Policy Theory’, In Lene Hansen and Ole Waever (eds) European Integration and National 
Identity : the Challenge of the Nordic States (London: Routledge, 2003), 20–49.
25 Ted Hopf, ‘Common-Sense Constructivism and Hegemony in World Politics’, Internation-
al Organization, 67 no. 2 (2013), 317–54.
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main discourses, that of status quo and territorial integrity, and three alter-
native doctrines: national self-determination, geopolitics and historical rights, 
and coded the materials accordingly. Different actors may apply each dis-
course in different contexts, as actors are not tied to one discourse or apply 
just one. After all, such discourses are analytical constructions, not empirical 
objects with a truth value.26 After reviewing the evolution of the discourse in 
Russia from the break-up of the Soviet Union to the Crimean annexation and 
beyond, we answer the question of whether the recent changes in policy can 
be understood against the background of discursive change. We will start by 
examining the discourse on status quo and territorial integrity, and then move 
on to discuss the three challenging doctrines: national self-determination, geo-
politics, and historical rights.
3 Discourse Sustaining Territorial Integrity and Status Quo
The principles of territorial integrity of sovereign states and the status quo of 
existing borders independently of their inconsistency have been the corner-
stones of the international border regime established and practiced after the 
Second World War.27 They have also been at the core of Russia’s view of inter-
national borders. Until the recognition of the independence of South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia in 2008, the Russian political leadership argued strongly for the 
principle of territorial integrity, both internally and externally. Russia was a 
status quo country both in terms of regime changes and territorial changes. 
Indeed, for Boris Yeltsin the key task was to “keep Russia territorially intact 
rather than enlarge it”.28 For example, in 1994 Yeltsin abstained from recogniz-
ing Crimea’s independence and did not agree to establish a union with Russia, 
as the president of Crimea had suggested.29
The territorial integrity principle was vital in particular for Russia’s internal 
use. Soon after the break-up of the Soviet Union, Russia’s integrity was chal-
lenged by calls for national self-determination by the republics of Tatarstan 
26 See e.g. Lene Hansen, Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War 
 (London: Routledge 2006) and Kevin Dunn and Iver Neumann, Undertaking Discourse 
Analysis for Social Research (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2016).
27 Mark Zacher, ‘The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of 
Force’, International Organization 55, no. 2, 215–250.
28 John O’Loughlin, ‘Geopolitical Fantasies and Ordinary Russians: Perception and Reality in 
the Post-Yeltsin Era’, Geopolitics 6, no. 1 (2001), 17–48, here p. 43.
29 See, for example, Alan Ingram, ‘Broadening Russia’s Borders? The Nationalist Challenge 
of the Congress of Russian Communities’, Political Geography 20, no. 2 (2001), 197–219.
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and Chechnya. The threat of Russia’s disintegration was present in the dis-
course of the political elite throughout the 1990s. The need to keep federation 
subjects as part of the federation was a priority, but due to ideological reasons 
and the weakness of the state structures, the Kremlin granted various rights to 
the regions. Power-sharing agreements with Tatarstan, and later Bashkorstan, 
and Kabardino-Balkariya were signed but a militarized conflict between the 
federation and Chechnya in 1994–1996 resulted in Chechnya’s de facto inde-
pendence. Hence, Russia strongly defended the norm of territorial integrity 
particularly because of Chechnya.30
During Putin’s presidency the idea of decentralized power was replaced by 
the idea of a power vertical.31 Even though separatism continued to be repre-
sented as one of the major threats to Russia until the late 2000s, these problems 
were less burning after the Second Chechen War, at least from the perspective 
of the Kremlin. For example, in his address to the Federal Assembly in 2003, 
Putin declared victory over the issues of separatism.32 Furthermore, during his 
election campaign in 2012 he argued that the problem of separatism “has been 
largely solved”,33 but he still warned that manifestations of separatism and na-
tionalism should be absolutely excluded from the political agenda.
In addition to the threat of internal separatism, Russian borders were also 
questioned from the outside after the break-up of the Soviet Union. Most fa-
mously, Japan demanded the return of four Kurile Islands that they regarded 
as their “Northern Territories”. As there was no peace treaty between the  Soviet 
Union and Japan after the end of the Second World War, these demands al-
ready existed during Soviet times but they were more forcefully put forward 
in the 1990s.34 Moreover, the borders with some of the former Soviet repub-
lics were contested. According to the Code accepted in 1992, the former  Soviet 
30 Mikulas Fabry, ‘The Contemporary Practice of State Recognition: Kosovo, South Ossetia, 
Abkhazia, and their aftermath’, Nationalities Papers 40, no. 5 (2012), 661–676, here p. 669.
31 See, for example, Richard Sakwa, The Crisis of Russian Democracy: the Dual State, Faction-
alism and the Medvedev Succession (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
32 Vladimir Putin, ‘Poslanie Federal’nomu Sobraniyu Rossiiskoi Federatsii’ [Address to the 
Federal Assembly], (16 March 2003), available at: {http://archive.kremlin.ru/text/appears/ 
2003/05/44623.shtml}, accessed 31 January 2019.
33 Vladimir Putin, ‘Demokratiya i kachestvo gosudarstva’ [Democracy and the Quality of the 
State]. Kommersant, 6 February, available at: {https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1866753}, 
accessed 31 January 2019.
34 See, Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, The Northern Territories Dispute and Russo-Japanese Relations: 
Volume 2, Neither War Nor Peace, 1985–1998 (Berkeley, CA: International and Area Studies 
Publications, University of California at Berkeley, 1998); Hiroshi Kimura, Distant Neigh-
bours. Vol. 2. Japanese-Russian Relations Under Gorbachev and Yeltsin (New York: M.E. 
Sharpe, 2000).
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 administrative borders between Russia and Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia 
were taken as state borders until the conclusion of border treaties with these 
countries. Particularly with Estonia and Latvia, the border treaty negotiations 
were difficult because these countries had lost strips of their territory to the 
 Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic after they had been incorporated 
into the Soviet Union, and they regarded these annexations as illegal.35 Poten-
tial historical border issues also existed with regard to the Kaliningrad area and 
the Karelian Isthmus that had been part of Germany and Finland respectively 
before the Second World War, but these states did not put forward any terri-
torial claims. Although Germany had denounced its interest for Kaliningrad, 
some Russians, including even scholars, feared that the threat of secession of 
 Kaliningrad was real and involved ‘third parties’36 and domestic debate over 
the Karelian question was conducted in Finland.37
Moreover, the border with China remained unsettled in some areas, for 
example, in 2003 Dmitry Trenin mentioned “a hypothetical probability that 
China may reanimate its territorial claims against Russia”.38 At the time, the 
Russian-Chinese border had not been demarcated for the totality of its 4,300 
kilometer length. Moreover, many Chinese felt that historically, large parts 
of Eastern Siberia were ancient Chinese lands. mgimo professor, China ex-
pert Aleksandr Lukin denied that China would have any territorial demands 
to Russia as officially China had not made any such claims. Lukin explained 
that some Chinese historians had brought up the opinion that Russia had cap-
tured many important Chinese territories in the 19th century, but all border 
questions with China had been solved.39 Instead, Russian experts emphasized 
that China and Russia have common interests in safeguarding the principles of 
state sovereignty and territorial integrity upon which also Shanghai Coopera-
tion Organisation (sco) was based.40
35 Claes Levinsson, ‘The Long Shadow of History: Post-Soviet Border Disputes – The Case of 
Estonia, Latvia, and Russia’, Connections 5, no. 2 (2006), 98–110.
36 Irina Kobrinskaya, ‘A Marathon Election Campaign’, Russia in Global Affairs, no. 1 (2002), 
available at: {http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_44}, accessed 31 January 2019.
37 Pertti Joenniemi, ‘The Karelian Question: On the Transformation of a Border Dispute’, 
Cooperation and Conflict 33, no. 2 (1998), 183–206.
38 Dmitry Trenin, ‘Euro-Pacific Nation’, Russia in Global Affairs, no. 1 (2003), available at: 
{http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_639} accessed 31 January 2019.
39 Aleksandr Lukin, ‘Rossiisko-kitaiskie otnosheniya: ne oslablyat’ usilii’ [Russian-Chinese 
relations: don’t ease off], Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn’ (30 November 2009).
40 Aleksandr Lukin, ‘Rossiya-Kitai’ [Russia-China], Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn’ (26 December 
2001); Mikhail Titarenko, ‘Rossiya, Kitai, Indiya v global’nom mire’ [Russia, China and 
 India in the global world], Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn’ (28 June 2002).
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Russia resisted actual and potential territorial claims with status quo rhet-
oric. Russian representatives held that border changes were not possible be-
cause of overall stability. Because all border adjustments are connected with 
wars, Yeltsin argued, even smaller ones would cause chaos in the whole of 
 Europe.41 In Putin’s view “changing borders is not the best way to resolve prob-
lems”, but instead he preferred “integration and cooperation”.42 For the  Russian 
leaders, mere domestic debate over territorial issues in the neighboring coun-
tries threatened stability and good neighborly relations: for example, in 1997 
Yeltsin stated in a press conference in conjunction with the meeting with the 
President of Finland: “I urge Finnish journalists in particular: take away the 
territorial issue from your newspapers and television”.43 With regard to Japan, 
Russia however was ready to negotiate and willing to return the two smallest of 
the four disputed islands in exchange for a peace treaty, but this was, in fact, the 
position of the Soviet Union already in the 1950s. Border treaties with  Latvia 
and Estonia were only signed when (even symbolic) reference to the pre-war 
borders was dropped. When these countries talked about restoring their pre-
war borders, Russians accused them for being irresponsible and obstinate.
As far as the territorial integrity of the post-Soviet states was concerned, 
Russia’s official discourse sustained the status quo. With regard to Georgia, un-
til 2008 Russia’s position echoed Evgenii Primakov’s ideas that Russia should 
try to build better relations with Georgia by recognizing its territorial integ-
rity.44 Putin also emphasized that “we proceed from the thesis of territorial 
integrity of Georgia”.45 Dmitri Medvedev contended in May 2008 that “we must 
41 Ruslan Ignatyev, ‘Chuzhoj zemli my ne hotim ni pyadi, No i svoej vershka ne otdadim’ [We 
Do not want others’ land but shall not give an inch of ours], Rossiiskaya Gazeta (14 April 
1994).
42 Vladimir Putin, ‘Zayavlenie dlya pressy i otvety na voprosy na sovmestnoi press-konferen-
tsii s Prezidentom Finlyandii Tar’ei Halonen’ [Press Release and Answers to the Questions 
at the Press Conference together with Tarja Halonen, President of Finland], (3 September 
2001), available at: {http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/21319}, accessed 31 
January 2019.
43 Boris Yeltsin, cited in Kalle Koponen, ’Jeltsin: Venäjä ei luovuta Karjalaa [Yeltsin: Russia 
Does not Cede Karelia]’, Helsingin Sanomat (28 November 1997), available at: {http://
www.hs.fi/kotimaa/art-2000003678453.html}, accessed 31 January 2019.
44 Yevgeni Primakov, ‘V proshedshem godu proyavilsya pozitivnyi kharakter kursa rukovod-
stva Rossii’ [In the Last Year a Positive Nature of the Russian Leadership’s Course Has 
Manifested], Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn’ (6 February 2004).
45 Vladimir Putin, ‘Nesmotrya na kataklizmy, 2004 god zakonchilsya v tselom so znakom 
plyus’ [Despite the cataclysms, 2004 has ended with a plus sign in general], Mezhdunarod-
naya zhizn’ (28 January 2005).
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have an extremely serious approach to any attempt … to meddle into other 
countries’ affairs, and attempts to redraw their borders”.46
Ukraine’s territorial integrity, too, was not officially contested. As diplomat 
Valerii Musatov stated in 1999, “Russia had recognized territorial integrity of 
Ukraine and its borders in the 1990 Agreement and again confirmed this in the 
Accord of the establishment of the cis in December 1991”.47 The ratification of 
the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between the  Russian 
Federation and Ukraine was pushed by the government, and by Yevgeny Pri-
makov in particular. The politicians, such the Moscow mayor Yurii Luzhkov, 
the well-known nationalist Sergei Baburin and members of the Liberal Demo-
cratic Party, who were demanding Crimea’s “reunification with Russia” or re-
sisted the ratification of the treaty on the basis that it “would fix the position of 
Crimea as belonging to Ukraine” were labelled as “ethnic nationalists and part 
of the neo-imperialist group”.48
The principle of territorial integrity was also defended on the instrumental 
grounds. Yekaterina Kuznetsova argued that “helping post-Soviet states to re-
store their integrity would bring Russia more dividends than the hopeless and 
costly support for the unrecognized autonomies”.49 Similarly, publicist  Leonid 
Radzikhovsky, who later criticized the annexation of Crimea, argued that 
“gaining new territories is precisely the thing that Russia does not need these 
days. – To support foreign separatism means to throw stones at your neighbors 
while living in a glass house.”50
Although the need to unite the Russian World (Pуccкий миp) beyond 
the current state borders was officially adopted in the mid-2000s, it did not 
directly contradict the principle of territorial integrity of other states. In his 
2005 address, Putin famously used the much-cited formulation “the collapse 
of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century”51  
46 Dmitri Medvedev, Speech at the Military Parade marking the 63rd Anniversary of Victory in 
the Great Patriotic War, (9 May 2008), available at: {http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/ 
transcripts/30}, accessed 31 January 2019.
47 Valerij Musatov, ‘Neprostaya sud’ba dogovora s Ukrainoj’ [Difficult Fate of the Treaty with 
Ukraine], Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn’, 2 (1 February 1999).
48 Igor Zevelev, ‘The Russian World Boundaries’.
49 Yekaterina Kuznetsova, ‘The Near Abroad: Increasingly Far Away from Russia’, Russia in 
Global Affairs, no. 1 (2005), available at: {http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_4411}, ac-
cessed 31 January 2019.
50 Leonid Radzikhovsky, ‘Georgiophobia’, Russia in Global Affairs, no. 4 (2004), available at: 
{http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_3879}, accessed 31 January 2019.
51 Vladimir Putin, ‘Poslanie Federal’nomu Sobraniyu Rossiiskoi Federatsii’ [Address to the 
Federal Assembly], (25 April 2005), available at: {http://kremlin.ru/events/president/
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but this can hardly be interpreted as a new doctrine. For example, with re-
gard to Crimea, the argument was made that it should and could be kept … 
“as part of the Russian world” even without “reunification”.52 Crimea’s “long 
return to home” would not mean annexation but civilizational integration, 
“return to one’s historical and cultural roots”.53 Yet, this presupposed Ukraine 
joining the Customs Union and the Eurasian Economic Union. Russian politi-
cians stressed, as did the then Duma Deputy Konstantin Kosachev, that Russia, 
“must clearly show to its partners that, for example, no one in Russia is going to 
reclaim the Crimea from Ukraine, but at the same time, that Moscow’s concern 
about the status of the Russian language in Ukraine or in the Baltic States has, 
not imperial, but natural grounds, as is the case with any Western country”.54
Dissatisfaction with the Russian Federation’s existing borders was prevalent 
within communist and nationalist groups ever since the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union. The communists and nationalists did not recognize the Russian 
Federation as real Russia: it was a stump which hungered the revival in its for-
mer borders or at least those of ‘Slavic nations’.55 The revision of borders was in 
the agenda of the communist opposition already in the early 1990s and it was 
supposed to happen by voluntarily re-establishing a Eurasian or Slavic union 
state (soyuznoe gosudarstvo).
There were, indeed, elements in the Russian discourse hinting that territo-
rial integrity would not apply to all post-Soviet states, because there were dif-
ferent levels of sovereignty.56 In particular, the former Soviet republics would 
not have full sovereignty over their former autonomous areas.57 For example, 
mgimo professor, Andranik Migranyan argued that “Azerbaijan, Moldova, 
transcripts/22931}, accessed 31 January 2019. See also, Mikhail Suslov, ‘“Russian World” 
Concept: Post-Soviet Geopolitical Ideology and the Logic of “Spheres of Influence”’, Geo-
politics 20, no. 2 (2018), 330–353.
52 Aleksandr Mashchenko, ‘Krymskaya odisseya’ [Crimean Odyssey], Mezhdunarodnaya 
zhizn’, no. 5 (31 May 2013).
53 Ibid.
54 Konstantin Kosachev, ‘Three Birds with One Stone?’, Russia in Global Affairs, no. 1 (2011), 
available at: {http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Three-Birds-with-One-Stone-15146}, ac-
cessed 31 January 2019.
55 On different understandings of Russian identity in the 1990s – Soviet, ethno-nationalist 
etc. see Vera Tolz, ‘Forging the nation: National identity and nation building in post- 
communist Russia’, Europe-Asia Studies, 50 no. 6 (1998), 993–1022.
56 Ruth Deyermond, ‘The Uses of Sovereignty in Twenty-first Century Russian Foreign Poli-
cy’, Europe-Asia Studies, 68 no. 6 (2016), 957–984.
57 Alexander Aksenyonok, ‘Self-Determination: Between Law and Politics’, Russia in Global 
Affairs, 1 (2007), available at: {http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_7979} accessed 31 
January 2019; Sergey Markedonov, ‘Unrecognized Geopolitics’, Russia in Global Affairs, 
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Ukraine or Georgia [did not have] a legitimate right to govern their secession-
ist territories – annexed to the master republics by Stalin’s personal wish and 
obstinacy. – Abkhazia and South Ossetia had positioned themselves outside 
the Georgian state even before the break-up of the Soviet Union.”58
In general, however, Russia firmly represented itself as the safeguard of the 
“Westphalian system”, and regarded the West as the destroyer of the interna-
tional order. A case in point was Kosovo. Even though Serb atrocities were rec-
ognized by Russian politicians, human rights violations were not something 
that would justify secession.59 The Foreign Policy Concept of 2008 criticized 
“some states that try to revise norms of international law in universal docu-
ments such as the UN Charter, Declaration of principles of international law, 
and the Final Act of osce from 1975”.60 The recognition of Kosovo’s indepen-
dence was seen as “a manifestation of deep global tendency of gradual destruc-
tion of the order that formed after the wwii on the principles of sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of states and on actual ban on secessions”.61 For ex-
ample, cprf leader Zyuganov warned about a domino effect in the case of 
recognizing independence of Kosovo: it would lead to demands for indepen-
dence of Catalonia, Basque land, Northern Ireland, Corsica, the collapse of 
the  Belgian federation and new disputes in the Balkans, “and this means new 
wars”.62 Similar warnings of a domino effects or mine fields were issued by 
many, for example Vladimir Lukin from Yabloko, for whom giving the right 
to national self-determination to all national entities “would lead to hell, to 
the self- destruction of the world”.63 Aleksei Arbatov predicted that Kosovo’s 
no. 1 (2006), available at: {http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_6186}, accessed 31 
 January 2019.
58 Andranik Migranyan, ‘Georgia Propelling Its Disintegration’, Russia in Global Affairs, no. 
4 (2004), available at: {http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_3878}, accessed 31 January 
2019.
59 For example, Iurii Luzhkov, ‘Vospominaniya o budushchem’ [Memories of the future], 
Izvestiya (23 March 2001); Aleksei Arbatov, ‘nato – glavnaia problema dlia evropeiskoi 
bezopasnosti’ [nato – the main problem for the European security], Nezavisimaia gazeta 
(16 April 1999).
60 The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, (12 July 2008), available at: {http://
en.kremlin.ru/supplement/4116}, accessed 31 January 2019.
61 Dmitrii Furman, ‘“Parad suverenitetov” v peredele mira’ [Parade of the Sovereignties in 
the Redivision of the World], Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn’, no. 5 (2008).
62 Cited in Sergei Obukhov ‘Dve Bolgarii. Gennadii Zyuganov: Rano spisyvat Rossiyu so 
schetov’, Sovetskaya Rossiya (24 October 2000).
63 Vladimir Lukin, ‘Groznye razdumiya, Natsionalnoe samoopredelenie – vernyi put k sa-
mounichtozheniyu’ [Bodeful thoughts, National self-determination – the right way to 
self-destruction], Segodnya (17 February 1995).
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 secession from Serbia “may provoke similar processes in Abkhazia, South 
 Ossetia, and Transdniestria”.64
The principles of territorial integrity and status quo were rather consistent-
ly supported by the Russia’s political elite also in other international crises.65 
They accused the West of “double standards” and deplored that the idea of sov-
ereignty and territorial integrity ceased to be axiomatic.66 However, some hint-
ed that Russia might also apply the principle of national self-determination 
where it deems it applicable because it could not just be a passive bystander.67
Even after the Georgian War and the recognition of South Ossetia and 
 Abkhazia, Russian leadership defended the principle of state sovereignty and 
status quo of borders. The Medvedev treaty proposal on European Security 
did not contain any new elements regarding the territorial regime, instead it 
was “guided by the principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations – 
and the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in 
 Europe”. Indeed, Sergey Karaganov argued that, “The future treaty must reiter-
ate the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act on the inviolability of the borders 
in order to prevent the further fragmentation of states or their reunification 
with the use of force. Kosovo, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia must become the 
last states that broke away through force. This ‘Pandora’s box’ must be shut, at 
least in Europe.”68
In sum, the principles sustaining status quo, the territorial integrity of sov-
ereign states and inviolability of borders, have been at the core of  Russian 
discourse since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Although there were 
64 Alexei Arbatov, ‘Is a New Cold War Imminent?’ Russia in Global Affairs, no. 3 (2007), avail-
able at: {http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_9127}, accessed 31 January 2019.
65 See, for example, Iurii Luzhkov, ‘Ne sprashivai, po kom zvonit kolokol’ [Don’t ask for 
whom the bell tolls], Izvestiya (13 July 2001b); also, Aleksei Arbatov, ‘nato – glavnaia 
problema dlia evropeiskoi bezopasnosti’ [nato – the main problem for the European 
security], Nezavisimaia gazeta (16 April 1999); Grigori Yavlinsky, ‘Ne vtiagivaite Rossiyu v 
voinu!’ [Don’t drag Russia into the war!], Literaturnaya gazeta (31 March 1999).
66 Sergey Karaganov, ‘The Chances and Challenges of the New World’, Russia in Global Af-
fairs, no. 2 (2003), available at: {http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_845}, accessed 31 
January 2019.
67 Konstantin Kosachev, ‘Proshlogodnie raskaty slyshny v 2004’ [The last-year’s peals are 
heard in 2004], Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn’ (16 January 2004), (Kosachev as a participant to 
a discussion here).
68 Sergei Karaganov, ‘The Magic Numbers of 2009’, Russia in Global Affairs, no. 2 (2009), 
available at: {http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_13036}, accessed 31 January 2019.
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 instrumental, internal reasons for this doctrine,69 it was not abandoned after 
the Chechen problem was stabilized. Yet, alternative discourses of borders also 
existed that either denied the full sovereignty and thereby territorial integrity 
of the former Soviet republics or lent support to principles that justified ter-
ritorial changes. Next, we will examine the discursive evolution of three such 
principles: national self-determination, geopolitics, and historical rights.
4 National Self-determination
Self-determination is a liberal doctrine that starts from the principle of self-
governance. The idea of national self-determination is however a contested 
doctrine. There are two basic variants: firstly, the view that there is a pre- 
existing nation that should be united in order to resort to self-determination, 
and secondly the view that individuals can express their own will, for exam-
ple, in a referendum with regard to the community to which they belong, and 
thus exercise national self-determination according to the views of the major-
ity. Moreover, there are two views with regard to when self-determination as 
a justification for secession: as a remedial right only when the population has 
been oppressed by the patron state or as a positive right even in the absence of 
political oppression.70
Self-determination has a long pedigree in the Russian discourse since the 
doctrine had already been part of Lenin’s policy at the time of the Russian 
revolution.71 During the Soviet era, it was mostly related to various degrees of 
autonomy granted to the territorial units on the basis of their nationhood. This 
then led to the basic justification of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In the 
1990s, there were politicians among the Russian elite who expressed general 
arguments in favour of further application of the principle of national self- 
determination. In the context of Chechen conflicts and in particular during the 
first Chechen War, these politicians tried to justify national self- determination 
as the will of the people, framing it as part of democracy discourse. Another 
69 Igor Zevelev, ‘Russia’s Policy Toward Compatriots in the Former Soviet Union’, Russia in 
Global Affairs no. 1 (2008), available at: {http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_10351}, ac-
cessed 31 January 2019.
70 See e.g. Margaret Moore, National Self-Determination and Secession (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press 1998).
71 V.I. Lenin, Critical Remarks on the National Question: The Right of Nations to Self- 
Determination (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1954 [1914]).
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section of the elite was focusing on national self-determination not as a gener-
al right, but only in terms of the rights of Russians in the former Soviet Union.
In the course of 1990s, support for self-determination declined rapidly. 
Those speaking on behalf of national self-determination as a general principle 
could be found, for example, in the Yabloko party. Grigorii Yavlinsky, the then 
leader of Yabloko, argued that territorial integrity was no higher value than 
the right of people to decide themselves what they wanted. He warned about 
consequences of forcing people to be Russian citizens; “…it would not become 
a republic inside Russia [v sostave Rossii], but a concentration camp inside 
 Russia. Of course, Russia can occupy this territory, but like that it cannot make 
people think in a different way.”72
Compared to the 1990s, the voices speaking on behalf of a generic princi-
ple of national self-determination were virtually absent in the Putin era. Only 
some pundits contended that Russia could voluntarily let some of its territories 
go, as Britain had released its colonies.73 Applying the right to entities, such as 
Chechnya, was rejected, because it could work as a catalyst for a domino effect. 
The [Marxist] “formula of ‘self-determination until secession’ has gone out of 
date”.74 Yet, the ethno-nationalist program for restoration of geographical con-
gruence between the state and the nation, advocating the creation of a new 
political entity of ethnic Russians and some East Slavs by reunifying Russia, 
Belarus, part of Ukraine, and northern Kazakhstan, was often discussed as an 
option and backed by the principle of self-determination. Aleksandr Tsipko 
for example asked “Why divided Germans had the right to re-unification but 
divided in 1991, Russians, Ukrainians and Belarussians do not?”75 There were 
several attempts from 1998 to 2001 to embody such ideas in legislative initia-
tives, but none of them was adopted.76
The key tendency was however the increasing concern for Russians and 
 Russian speakers living in the former Soviet states. Karaganov argued that 
72 Grigori Yavlinsky, ‘Vlast b’etsia v konvulsiiakh samopoedaniia. Lider “Iabloka” kritikuet 
vsekh i po vsem azimutam’ [The authority is convulsing in self-abuse. The Leader of 
‘Yabloko’ critizes everyone on all azimuths], Nezavisimaia gazeta (16 October 1996).
73 Vladislav Inozemtsev, ‘Colonies vs. Dependencies: An Invitation to a Discourse’, Russia 
in Global Affairs no. 2 (2013), available at: {http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Vladimir 
-Putins-Fourth-Vector---16048}, accessed 31 January 2019.
74 Yevgeni Primakov, ‘Voina s islamom mozhet raskolot Rossiiu’ [A war with Islam may split 
Russia], Izvestiya (5 November 2002).
75 Aleksandr Tsipko, ‘Argumenty v zashchity rossiiskogo suvereniteta’ [Arguments for the 
Russian Sovereignty], Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn’ (15 August 2003).
76 Igor Zevelev, ‘Russia’s Future: Nation or Civilization?’, Russia in Global Affairs, no. 4 (2009), 
available at: {http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_14246}, accessed 31 January 2019.
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 neither a neo-imperialist policy of re-establishing the Soviet empire, nor a 
policy aimed at strengthening the statehood of the “newly independent re-
publics” are feasible.77 Russia should therefore try to find out a third way be-
tween the two: the county should play an active post-imperial role in creating 
a confederation. In this context, Karaganov regarded the Russian speakers in 
the former Soviet States as an important asset in exercising influence. The idea 
that Russia has special rights in protecting ethnic Russians or Russia-speakers 
was labelled the “Karaganov doctrine”. This doctrine did not, however, direct-
ly imply territorial changes but was seen as being in line with what Russians 
regarded as widely shared principles of minority rights.78 However, Russian 
peace-keeping operations in the area of the former Soviet Union were already 
then seen to prove that the principle of status quo was wishful thinking.79 The 
argument that the principles of territorial integrity and the inviolability of bor-
ders should not have been followed so mechanistically when the ussr was 
dissolved was also articulated in Kozyrev’s famous mock speech at the csce 
foreign ministers meeting in December 1992.80
This view stressing self-determination of ethnic Russians continued to be 
expressed in the 2000s. For example, Sergei Kortunov argued that there should 
have been negotiation processes on disputed territories and borders, and that 
the question of national self-determination should have been brought up ac-
cordingly.81 Vladimir Degoyev also wrote that bringing the process of the Soviet 
Union’s disintegration to a logical end would entail “international recognition 
of the right to self-determination for those peoples living in the post-Soviet 
area, including those willing to be incorporated into Russia”.82 Yet, overall there 
was little support for the recognition of these entities as independent states.
In the case of Kosovo, Russia’s position was that secession is possible but 
only if the very existence of the people in question is threatened: ‘outside the 
77 Sergey Karaganov, ‘On Russia focused people interest defending issues in “close border-
lands”’, Diplomaticheskii Vestņik, 21–22 (15–30 November 1992).
78 See also, The Foreign Policy Concept (18 February 2013), available at: {http://www.mid 
.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/
id/122186}, accessed 31 January 2019.
79 Pavel Baev, ‘Peace-Keeping as a Challenge to European Borders’, Security Dialogue, 24 no. 
2 (1993), 137–150.
80 Andrei Kozyrev, ‘Speech at the csce meeting’, Stockholm (14 December 1992).
81 Sergei Kortunov, ‘Natsional’naya identichnost’ ‘Rossii: vneshnepoliticheskoe izmerenie’, 
Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn’ (6 June 2003).
82 Vladimir Degoyev, ‘Wider Europe’s Horizons in the Caucasus’, Russia in Global Affairs, no. 
4 (2004), available at: {http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_3886}, accessed 31 January 
2019.
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colonial context, international law allows for secession of a part of a State 
against the latter’s will only as a matter of self-determination of peoples, and 
only in extreme circumstances, when the people concerned is continuously 
subjected to most severe forms of oppression that endangers the very exis-
tence of the people’.83 In August 2008, Russia nonetheless decided to recog-
nize the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia “considering the freely 
expressed will of the Ossetian and Abkhaz peoples”, which was seen as obvious 
tit-for-tat for the Western recognition of Kosovo.84 By and large, the justifica-
tions used by Russia mimicked those of the Western recognition of Kosovo.85 
Indeed, Medvedev defended the policy of recognition by saying that “you can-
not have one rule for some and another rule for others”.86 Moreover, it was 
claimed that “Russia remained committed to the principle of a country’s terri-
torial integrity to the very end” but due to the “mass killings of Russian citizens” 
and the recognition of Kosovo by the West, it was forced to recognize the in-
dependence of the territories where “the metropolitan nation had committed 
acts of unjustifiable cruelty”.87 That can be seen as a reason why no recognition 
of Transniestria or Nagorno-Karabakh followed. In any case, Russia still did not 
recognize the independence of Kosovo. The recognition of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia was hence not a complete turning point in the Russian discourse, 
although the inconsistency of Russia’s policy of recognition was noted also in 
the Russian debate.88
Self-determination played a key role in Russia’s argumentation justifying the 
annexation of Crimea. In the view of Putin, the residents of Crimea exercised 
their right of self-determination: “First of all there was a need to help to create 
conditions for peaceful, free will-expressing (volition), so that the Crimeans 
83 ‘Written Statement of the Russian Federation’, International Court of Justice, 16 April 
2009, 39–40, available at { https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/141/written-proceedings}, ac-
cessed 31 January 2019.
84 Mikulas Fabry, ‘The Contemporary Practice of State Recognition: Kosovo, South Ossetia, 
Abkhazia, and their aftermath’, Nationalities Papers, 40 no. 5 (2012), 661–676, here p. 661.
85 Bruno Coppieters, ‘Conflict resolution after the 2008 Georgia-Russia War: the Taiwan and 
Kosovo models as tools for mobilization and comparison’, Nationalities Papers, 40 no. 5 
(2012), 677–701, here p. 667.
86 Quoted in ibid, 680.
87 Ivan Kotlyarov, ‘The Logic of South Ossetia Conflict’, Russia in Global Affairs, 4 (2008), 
available at: {http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_11891} accessed 31 January 2019.
88 Alexander Buzgalin and Andrei Kolganov, ‘The Caucasian War and Public Interest’, Russia 
in Global Affairs, no. 4 (2008), available at: {http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_11890}, 
accessed 31 January 2019.
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could themselves determine their fate for the first time in history”.89 Medve-
dev resorted to historical parallels of national self-determination leading to 
unification, as the “re-integration of Crimea” was in his view comparable to the 
fall of the Berlin Wall and unification of Germany, or return of Hong Kong and 
Macao to mainland China.90 The same argumentative logic was partly applied 
for the separatists’ cause in South Eastern Ukraine.
To the extent self-determination was accepted as a valid reason for se-
cession, Russian leaders regarded it as a remedial right only.91 Interestingly, 
in  December 2013 Putin had argued that Crimea on the one hand and South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia on the other should not be compared with each other, 
because in South Ossetia and Abkhazia it was a question of wide, bloody, inter-
ethnic conflict. Moreover, attacks on Russian peacekeepers was the primary 
cause of the war there. “In Crimea there is nothing like that and I hope there 
will not be. We have a contract of keeping our fleet there. It is a stabilizing fac-
tor of international and regional politics”.92 Accordingly, in the Crimean case, 
it was then stressed that suppression justified secession: the Ukrainian revolu-
tion was to be blamed for the change of Russia’s policy. Had the “special lan-
guage regime” and autonomy continued, Russia would not have seen the need 
for reunification. But “now things looked different: nationalists who came to 
power in Kyiv, the repeal of the law on languages, and, the most importantly, 
the uncertain legitimacy of the central government.”93 “Russia had never said 
that Crimea should become part of Russia. – But Kyiv is not ready for coopera-
tion or dialogue, and this is the central issue.”94
89 Vladimir Putin, ‘Obrashchenie Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii’ [Address by President of 
the Russian Federation], (18 March 2014), available at: {http://kremlin.ru/events/president/ 
news/20603}, accessed 31 January 2019.
90 Dmitri Medvedev, ‘Otchet Pravitel’stva o rezul’tatakh raboty v 2014 godu’ [Government 
report on its performance in 2014], (21 April 2015).
91 Tero Lundstedt, ‘The Changing nature of the Contemporary Russian Interpretation of 
the Right to Self-Determination under International law’, in P. Sean Morris (ed.), Russian 
Discourses on International Law: Sociological and Philosophical Phenomenon (New York: 
Routledge, 2019), 197–219.
92 Vladimir Putin, ‘Press-konferentsiya Vladimira Putina’ [News conference of Vladimir 
 Putin] (19 December 2013), available at: {http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19859}, 
accessed 31 January 2019.
93 Vladimir Bruter, ‘Failing Again – But Better than before’, Russia in Global Affairs, no. 1 (2014), 
available at: {http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Failing-Again—But-Better-Than-Before 
-16497}, accessed 31 January 2019.
94 Ibid.
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There were only few who publicly criticized the annexation of Crimea in 
Russia. These critics did not, however, deny the principle of self-determination 
as such but emphasized that it violated the principle of territorial integrity and 
inviolability of borders. For example, Yabloko, albeit without any broader sup-
port in Russian society, regarded the annexation of Crimea as a violation of 
international law and the UN Charter.95 Yabloko represented itself as “in op-
position to aggressive neo-imperial course of Vladimir Putin”.96
Russia’s policy towards national self-determination did not manifest itself 
as a new doctrine in favour of secession in international crises and issues of 
separatism. Although many Russians who are seen as pro-Kremlin voices sup-
ported the drive for Scottish independence, underlining the parallels with the 
Crimean case,97 Putin himself stated before the annexation of Crimea that 
Scottish independence is a domestic matter for Britain. In his view, European 
integration makes claims for self-determination more acceptable, but he add-
ed that “one should not forget that being part of a single, strong state has some 
advantages and one should not overlook this.”98 Similar kind of argumentation 
can be found with regard to the Catalan issue. In February 2006 Putin argued 
that Catalan decisions and Spanish authorities’ reaction to them is an internal 
affair of Spain.99 He further discussed the benefits of powerful unions (moshch-
nie, bolshie obedineniya) in the era of globalization and competition, but also 
recognized the right of smaller peoples and ethnic groups to their  cultural and 
95 Yabloko, ‘Neoimperskii kurs vedet k katastrofe’. Zayavlenie rodp “yabloko” [Neo-impe-
rial course leads to the disaster. Statement of the rudp “yabloko”], (19 March 2014).
96 Ibid, see also, for example, Boris Vishnevsky, ‘Pomoshch podzhigatelei pogorel’tsam’ [Ar-
sonists’ help to the fire vitims], Yabloko (12 August 2014), available at: {http://spb.yabloko.
ru/node/3022}, accessed 31 January 2019; Sergei Mitrokhin, ‘Tsena otzhima Kryma’ [The 
price of grabbing Crimea], Interview in Radio Svoboda by Mikhail Sokolov (21 March 
2016), available at: {http://www.yabloko.ru/publikatsii/2016/03/21_2}, accessed 31 January 
2019; Sergei Mitrokhin, ‘“Yabloko” khochet v Dumu!’ [Yabloko wants to get into the State 
Duma], Interview in Radio Svoboda (6 July 2016), available at: {http://www.yabloko.ru/
publikatsii/2016/07/06_1}, accessed 31 January 2019.
97 Tom Parfitt, ‘Pro-Kremlin bloggers throw weight behind Scottish independence’, Daily Tele-
graph (10 September 2014), available at: {http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ 
europe/russia/11087449/Pro-Kremlin-bloggers-throw-weight-behind-Scottish 
-independence.html}, accessed 31 January 2019.
98 ‘Scottish independence: Vladimir Putin says referendum “a domestic issue”’, bbc News 
(19 January 2014), available at: {http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics 
-25800441}, accessed 31 January 2019.
99 Vladimir Putin, ‘Interv’yu ispanskim sredstvam massovoi informatsii’ [Interview to the 
Spanish Media], (7 February 2006), available at: {http://kremlin.ru/events/president/
transcripts/23419}, accessed 31 January 2019.
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national identity that could be preserved by creating autonomy. In September 
2017, Russian reactions to the independence referendum in Catalonia consis-
tently regarded the issue Spain’s own domestic affair that should be resolved 
on the basis of Spanish law.100 The key target of criticism was, not surprisingly, 
the Western hypocritical attitude and double standards in the issue compared 
to Crimea or Kosovo.
While Russian leaders have refrained from lending any direct support to 
separatism in the West, there have been allegations of backing these move-
ments. There was, for example, a strange meeting titled ‘A dialogue of nations: 
Peoples’ right to self-determination and the building of a multi-polar world,’ 
of Western separatist movements that was held in Moscow in September 2015. 
The meeting was organized by an anti-globalization movement that lacked 
any official status but was reportedly backed by the Kremlin.101
In sum, although Russia relied on the precedent of Kosovo in the cases of 
South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Crimea, there was not a strong discourse ad-
vocating self-determination as a general principle nor did Russia recognize 
 Kosovo for that matter. Even in the case of Crimea, it was seen not as a positive 
but a remedial right under oppression. National self-determination has thus 
been part of Russian discourse of borders, but it has mostly concerned the 
rights of Russians or Russian speakers or other proxy groups, as part of Russia’s 
compatriot policy.
5 Geopolitical Justifications
Any argument dealing with borders and territories can be seen as “geopoliti-
cal” but two geopolitical arguments with regard to justifying border changes 
can be seen at the core of traditional geopolitical thinking: the idea of nat-
ural borders, such as mountains, deserts, oceans or rivers, and the idea that 
great powers should be able and have a moral right to expand their borders. 
When Astrov and Morozova claim that geopolitics held a privileged position 
100 For example, Maria Zakharova, ‘Briefing by Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharo-
va’, Moscow (28 September 2017), available at: {http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/foreign 
_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2879203#0}, accessed 31 
January 2019.
101 ‘Russian “Anti-Globalization” Movement to Unite Separatists From Western Countries’, 
The Moscow Times Online (16 September 2015), available at: {https://themoscowtimes 
.com/news/russian-anti-globalization-movement-to-unite-separatists-from-western 
-countries-49589}, accessed 31 January 2019.
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 throughout the 1990s but was diminishing during the Putin era in the 2000s, it 
does not necessarily mean that there was an articulated geopolitical doctrine 
with regard to Russia’s borders and the territorial regime in general.102 Part of 
the problem is that geopolitics is often represented as a deterministic force 
rather than as a political doctrine that would be in need of any justification.
The idea of natural borders is notoriously ambivalent especially in the case 
of Russia, because, as often noted, Russia lacks natural borders apart from the 
Arctic Sea in the North and the Pacific Ocean in the East. Vladimir  Zhirinovsky 
and the Liberal Democrats have argued for the territorial expansion of Russia on 
the basis of returning the natural borders, but here natural borders were mainly 
conceived historically either in the extent of the Soviet Union or sometimes 
the czarist Russia, including Finland and parts of Poland, or comprising the 
 Russian Orthodox world. Sometimes “natural borders” extends to new areas, as 
a natural growth of the great power. In his autobiography, The Final Thrust to the 
South, Zhirinovsky argued for a division of the world by the great powers that 
would allow Russia to acquire Iran, Turkey, and Afghanistan.  Russian soldiers, 
he wrote, would “wash their boots in the warm water of the Indian Ocean.”103
Russia’s decision to annex the Crimean peninsula and the support to sepa-
ratist in the Eastern Ukraine has been, however, most often associated with 
 Alexander Dugin’s geopolitical neo-Eurasianist thinking. Barbashin and 
 Thoburn, for example, named Dugin as “Putin’s Brain”.104 In their view, Dugin’s 
ideas gained in popularity during the 2000s mirroring Putin’s own transition 
from apparent democrat to authoritarian. When Putin recognized the attrac-
tiveness of Dugin’s ideas to many Russians, he seized on some of them to fur-
ther his own goals.105 Dugin’s role seemed to be limited, however, although he 
became a sort of cult figure and is probably the most well-known advocate of 
Russia’s expansion. For a long time, he was considered politically marginal and 
his position at Moscow State University in June 2014 was discontinued with 
the publicly declared reason that the “university is a place for science and not 
for politics”.106
102 Alexander Astrov and Natalia Morozova, ‘Russia: Geopolitics from the Heartland’, in 
Guzzini (ed.), The Return of Geopolitics in Europe? 192.
103 Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Poslednii brosok na yug [The Final Thrust to the South] (Moskva: 
Pisatel’ Bukvitsa, 1993).
104 Anton Barbashin and Hannah Thoburn, ‘Putin’s Brain: Alexander Dugin and the Phi-
losophy Behind Putin’s Invasion of Crimea’, Foreign Affairs (31 March 2014), available at: 
{https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-03-31/putins-brain}, accessed 31 
January 2019.
105 Ibid.
106 See, for example, ‘Aleksandr Dugin uvolen iz mgu’, Vesti (28 June 2014), available at: 
{http://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=1735926}, accessed 31 January 2019.
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Dugin’s ideas gathered nevertheless a lot of attention.107 Dugin has devel-
oped his ideas in many books such Osnovy geopolitiki. Geopoliticheskoe budu-
shchee Rossii, (1997) and other writings.108 In his writings, Dugin combined 
ideas of classical Western geopolitics, such as the eternal struggle between the 
Land and Sea Power, maritime (talassokratiya) and continental civilizations 
(tellurokratiya), with those of inter-war Eurasianist emigrants who believed 
that Russia is a unique civilization representing the Eurasian heartland. Dugin 
hence argues that continentalism and empire-building are the Russians’ desti-
ny, and Russia should therefore expand and become a new continental empire 
that opposes Atlanticism, globalisation, market-based economy, liberalism, 
and the foremost power that advocates all these, the United States. For Dugin, 
the Ukrainian crisis was part of this struggle between these two civilizations 
that were dividing the country.109 Moreover, Dugin represents classic organic 
thinking of territorial growth. In his view, the boundaries of Russia
should keep growing up to the moment when they cannot grow anymore. 
We’ve reached moments when we could not grow, we fall, and after that, 
each time in our history, we grow more. Our empire is a kind of heart, a 
beating heart with systoles and diastoles. I think Eurasia is our natural 
boundary. We won’t touch England or Western Europe.110
The idea on building a new Russian empire is not limited to Dugin and his 
followers. One key figure of such imperial nationalists is the writer Aleksandr 
Prokhanov who has advocated the birth of ‘the Fifth Empire’ after four  earlier 
in the history of Russia.111 These protagonists are often somewhat vague in de-
fining the exact borders of the empire, but typically it comprises at least the 
current Eurasian Economic Union. If there is an argument justifying the em-
pire, it is based on the idealization of the empire as a state form and the idea 
that the small independent countries are not able to survive and flourish alone.
107 For example, Marlène Laruelle, Russian Eurasianism. An Ideology of Empire (Washing-
ton, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2008); Anton Shekhovtsov and Andreas Umland, 
‘Is Aleksandr Dugin a Traditionalist? “Neo-Eurasianism” and Perennial Philosophy’, The 
 Russian Review, 68 no. 4 (2009), 662–678.
108 See, for example, James Heiser, ‘The American Empire Should be Destroyed’: Alexander 
 Dugin and the Perils of Immantized Eschatology (Malone: Repristination Press, 2014).
109 ‘Aleksandr Dugin: Krym dolzhen byt’ v avangarde Russkogo mira’, Novorossiya (4 August 
2014), available at: {novorossia.su/ru/node/4781}, accessed 31 January 2019.
110 Alexander Dugin, ‘Russian Identity and Putin’, Geopolitica.ru (22 November 2017), avail-
able at: {https://www.geopolitica.ru/en/article/russian-identity-and-putin}, accessed 31 
January 2019.
111 Aleksandr Prokhanov, Pyataya imperia [The Fifth Empire] (Moskva: Eksmo, 2007).
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Russia’s official discourse when it comes to such geopolitical justifications 
in a general sense has been rather negative, although many liberals detect a 
continuing influence of an empire complex in Russia.112 Russian leaders have 
taken distance from the imperial nationalists and averred that might is not 
right: neither superior nor growing power, nor the concept of natural borders 
are valid justifications for territorial annexations and border changes. Putin 
has emphasized that Russia has and will have no imperial ambitions hinting 
that such ambitions would be neither rational nor popular.113 In contrast, in 
the Russian discourse it is the United States that is accused of classical geopo-
litical goals of striving for domination.114
Although Eurasianist and other imperial geopolitical programs have been 
part of the discourse in Russia, they were neither the mainstream nor the offi-
cial rhetoric of the Kremlin.115 Dugin’s views gained ground before the annexa-
tion of Crimea, but his direct influence remained marginal and the Kremlin 
soon distanced itself from his thinking. The geopolitical discourse in Russia 
has mainly served a national purpose and imperial visions have not been for-
mulated as general principles for justifying territorial changes.
6 Historical Rights
Historical rights are almost always marshalled in favor of border changes 
when territorial claims are made.116 There are two basic forms of argumenta-
tion based on historical rights: the idea of first occupation, and the illegal or 
wrongful transfer of the territory in the past. Although such motivations can 
112 For example, Emil Pain, ‘Will Russia Transform Into a Nationalist Empire?’, Russia in 
Global Affairs, no. 2 (2005), available at: {http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_4954}, ac-
cessed 31 January 2019.
113 Vladimir Putin, ‘V.V. Putin vsretilsya s chlenami mezhdunarodnogo diskussionnogo kluba 
”Valdai”’ [V.V. Putin met with members of the Valdai International Discussion Club], (11 
September 2008), available at: {http://archive.government.ru/docs/1897/}, accessed 31 
January 2019.
114 See e.g. Ruslan Dzarasov, “Interesy SShA v Evrazii i Ukraine” [US interests in Eurasia and 
Ukraine], Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn’ (2015), available at {https://interaffairs.ru/jauthor/
material/1370}, accessed 31 January 2019.
115 See also, Alexander Astrov and Natalia Morozova, ‘Russia: Geopolitics from the Heart-
land’, in Stefano Guzzini (ed.), The Return of Geopolitics in Europe?, 192–216.
116 Alexander Murphy, ‘Historical Justifications for Territorial Claims’, Annals of the Associa-
tion of American Geographers, 80 no. 4 (1990), 531–548.
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be  appealing in a nostalgic or moral sense, they have rather clearly been ex-
cluded as convincing arguments in the current status quo regime.
As already mentioned, some historical borders have often been seen as 
‘natural’ for Russia, but there has been no single historical era that would be 
favored as constituting the historical right. Czarist Russia as of 1917 is one such 
point in time, and the Soviet Union of 1991 may also be used as a historical ref-
erence. Many geopolitical narratives of the Russian state that have formed part 
of the rhetoric date back much further, even as far as medieval Kievan Rus.117 
The most contested historically are the Soviet borders, however. Putin’s state-
ment that the dissolution of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical ca-
tastrophe of the 20th century118 was not an argument for territorial changes, 
but it chimed with such motivations because the wider political elite had not 
abandoned the nostalgia for a greater Russia of some description.119
The decision to annex Crimea was forcefully justified on historical grounds 
along with the principles of self-determination and the need to protect the 
rights of Russians. In his March 18 speech to the Duma, Putin explained how 
“in people’s hearts and minds, Crimea has always been an inseparable part of 
Russia”. The territory was not only historically Russian, but the way Crimea had 
become part of Ukraine was even more unjust: “Then in 1954 a decision was 
made to transfer the Crimean Region to Ukraine along with Sevastopol despite 
the fact that it was a federal city […] What matters now is that this decision 
was made in clear violation of the constitutional norms that were in place even 
then. The decision was made behind the scenes”. When Ukraine gained inde-
pendence in 1991, it constituted an “outrageous historical injustice” to Crimea 
and the Crimean people, who were treated “like a sack of potatoes”.120
Despite Putin’s strong rhetoric, the doctrine of historical rights justifying 
territorial changes did not become part of Russia’s policy otherwise, and it has 
117 Serhii Plokhy, Lost Kingdom: The Quest for Empire and the Making of the Russian Nation 
(New York: Basic Books, 2017).
118 Vladimir Putin, ‘Poslanie Federal’nomu Sobraniyu Rossiiskoi Federatsii’ [Address to the 
Federal Assembly] (25 April 2005), available at: {http://kremlin.ru/events/president/ 
transcripts/22931}, accessed 31 January 2019.
119 See, for example, Sirke Mäkinen, Russian Geopolitical Visions and Argumentation. Parties 
of Power, Democratic and Communist Opposition on Chechnia and nato, 1994–2003, Acta 
Universitatis Tamperensis 1293 (Tampere University Press 2008); Alan Ingram, ‘Broaden-
ing Russia’s Borders? The Nationalist Challenge of the Congress of Russian Communities’, 
Political Geography, 20:2 (2001), 197–219.
120 Vladimir Putin, ‘Obrashchenie Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii’ [Address by President of 
the Russian Federation], (18 March 2014), available at: {http://kremlin.ru/events/president/ 
news/20603}, accessed 31 January 2019.
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remained rather vague as a principle. With regard to Eastern Ukraine, Putin 
also employed historical argumentation. In the “direct line” interview, he said: 
“I would like to remind you that what was called Novorossiya (New Russia) 
back in the Tsarist days – Kharkov, Lugansk, Donetsk, Kherson, Nikolayev and 
Odessa – were not part of Ukraine back then. These territories were given to 
Ukraine in the 1920s by the Soviet government. Why? Who knows?”121 Else-
where, he also referred to the territories transferred from Poland and Hungary 
to Ukraine.122 Yet Putin did not make any territorial claims on that basis and the 
whole concept of Novorossiya was subsequently avoided.123 Although it seems 
that the historical motivation was essential in the Crimean case,  Russian rep-
resentatives did not elaborate on when such historical rights would give rise to 
territorial changes elsewhere. There was no attempt to build a general doctrine 
or suggest a new border regime on the basis of historical rights. Paradoxically, 
on the basis of the Crimean case alone, it would seem that a country that has 
voluntarily (although ‘illegally’) transferred a piece of territory to another en-
tity in the past has a stronger claim on it than if that piece had been forcefully 
seized.
Moreover, nationalists can claim that the historical rights of Russia cover 
the whole of Ukraine. For example, Duma deputy Gennadi Zyuganov from 
the Communist Party has argued that Ukraine is an inseparable part of both 
 Russian (russkii) consciousness and Russian (rossiiskii) history. As a conse-
quence, Russia needs to protect the unity of “our civilizational space, histori-
cally formed and which has existed around Russia for centuries”.124
In particular, Russia has not given any hint of historical rights existing with 
regard to current Russian territories that have belonged to other states in the 
past. In the dispute over the Kuril Islands with Japan, the Russian position is 
that the prior ownership of the islands is irrelevant: instead, it has urged Tokyo 
to recognize the results of the Second World War.125 In fact, the history of such 
121 Vladimir Putin, ‘Direct Line with Vladimir Putin’, (17 April 2014), available at: {http://
en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20796}, accessed 31 January 2019.
122 Putin, “Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club.”
123 John O’Loughlin, Gerard Toal and Vladimir Kolosov, ‘The Rise and Fall of “Novorossiya”: 
Examining Support for a Separatist Geopolitical Imaginary in Southeast Ukraine’, Post-
Soviet Affairs 33 no. 2 (2017), 124–144.
124 Georgii Muradov, “Transformatsiya miroustroistva i perspektivy razvitiya evraziiskoi in-
tegratsii. Krimskii kontekst” [Transformation of the World Order and Prospects for the 
Development of Eurasian Integration – the Crimean Context], Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn’ 
no. 1, (2015), 143–149, here p. 144.
125 Maria Tsvetkova, ‘Russia calls on Japan to recognize outcome of World War Two’, Reuters 
(16 January 2019), available at: {https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-lavrov-japan/
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territories is sometimes depicted as if they had always been part of Russia. For 
example, in the speech that Putin delivered on the occasion of the Celebra-
tions of the 750th Anniversary of Kaliningrad, he made no reference to the 
German background of the city, stating instead that “it was here that our first 
contacts with European countries began”.126
In general, Russia has not acknowledged views on historical rights in other 
cases in the world as a cause for border changes. Typically, such rights are only 
referred to when they are harnessed in support of the existing status quo, as 
in the case of Kosovo for example, where Russia supported the Serbian view 
that the territory was the historical heart of Serbia. Sometimes the principle 
of historical rights can be read between the lines when Western countries are 
criticized for their double standards. For example, the Russian representative 
to the UN, Vitaly Churkin, said that Britain should “clear its conscience” by 
“giving back” the Falklands and Gibraltar before it passes judgment on the 
Kremlin’s annexation of Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula.127 One case where 
Russia may have formulated its position on a historical basis with regard to 
the border question is the Palestine issue. Russia has consistently supported 
Palestine’s prerogative to create its own independent state with pre-1967 bor-
ders, regarding it as Palestinians’ legal right, as well as a way to stabilize the 
region.128 Moreover, an isolated attempt to refer to the historical rights of other 
nations occurred in 2014 when Zhirinovsky approached Polish, Hungarian and 
Romanian embassies in Moscow and suggested having referenda in those re-
gions of Ukraine that had formerly been part of the corresponding countries 
russia-calls-on-japan-to-recognize-outcome-of-world-war-two-idUSKCN1PA0WV}, ac-
cessed 31 Janaury 2019.
126 Vladimir Putin, ‘Speech at the Celebrations of the 750th Anniversary of Kaliningrad’, 
Kaliningrad (2 July 2005), available at: {http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/tran-
scripts/23071}, accessed 31 January 2019.
127 Tom Parfitt, ‘Give back Gibraltar before criticising us, says Russia’, The Times (4 February 
2017), available at: {https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/give-back-gibraltar-before-criti-
cising-us-says-russia-8scvm32n9}, accessed 31 January 2019.
128 See, Dmitri Medvedev, ‘Dmitry Medvedev sent a message of congratulations to President 
of the State of Palestine and Chairman of the Palestinian National Authority Mahmoud 
Abbas on the Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People’ (28 November 2008), avail-
able at: {http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/2256}, accessed 31 January 2019; 
and Vladimir Putin, ‘Ego Prevoskhoditel’stvu gospodinu Mahmudu Abbasu, Prezidentu 
Gosudarstva Palestiny’ [His Excellency Mr. Mahmoud Abbas, President of the State of 
Palestine] (29 November 2014), available at: {http://kremlin.ru/events/president/letters/ 
47110}, accessed 31 January 2019.
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to ask whether they wished to leave Ukraine and reunite with their former 
‘masters’.129
In sum, historical rights were very strongly brought to bear in the Crimean 
case in the official rhetoric. Yet such justification was seldom used in the of-
ficial discourse before the annexation of Crimea other than in a very ambiva-
lent and nostalgic way, and it has not been used more widely in international 
territorial conflicts. On the contrary, Russia has objected if others have used it.
7 Conclusions
Despite the annexation of Crimea, Russia’s official discourse on territorial 
changes and the legitimacy of existing borders has not changed dramatically 
since the break-up of the Soviet Union. On the one hand, Russia has not aban-
doned the status quo regime as a key principle of international territorial or-
der. On the other hand, reformist discourses justifying border changes on the 
grounds of self-determination, geopolitics, and historical justice have always 
been present in one form or another in the Russian discourse. What changed 
in the context of the Crimean annexation is that they were incorporated into 
the discourse of the state leadership for a short while. They did not, however, 
form a new doctrine beyond the case of Crimea. To a great extent, the politi-
cal leadership did not invent a new discourse but leaned on arguments put 
forward by nationalists and communists that were marginalized during the 
1990s and early 2000s.
Likewise, support for the status quo of borders and the territorial integri-
ty of sovereign states in line with the commitment to principles of interna-
tional law in general has dominated Russia’s official discourse when it comes 
to international crises and conflicts involving a territorial dimension. Russia 
has not developed and articulated an alternative stance on an international 
border regime that would defend territorial changes in a general sense on the 
basis of geopolitical rights, self-determination, or historical justice. Rather, 
such doctrines have been ad hoc and marshalled in support of Russia’s posi-
tion in a few chosen cases, but not as a general rule that would be accepted 
independently of whoever is making the claim. The non-recognition policy 
still applies to secessionist movements around the world, including Republika 
Srpska,  Nagorno-Karabakh, and Transnistria, as well as Kosovo. Against this 
129 For example, ‘Zhirinovsky predlozhil Polshe podelit Ukrainu’, [Zhirinovsky suggested 
 Poland to divide Ukraine], bbc (24 March 2014), available at: {http://www.bbc.com/russian/ 
international/2014/03/140324_zhirinovsky_poland_ukraine}, accessed 31 January 2019.
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background, the recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, plus Crimea, are 
exceptions that have not been singled out by a coherent doctrine. In this sense, 
Russia has adopted the same “double standards” that it has been so quick to ac-
cuse the West of. Relatedly, the dominant discourse has become more ambiva-
lent than before, particularly with regard to the right to self-determination. 
Moreover, official positions notwithstanding, the Kremlin has allowed and 
supported unofficial campaigns in favor of separatist movements in the West.
If the discourse on borders and territorial questions did not change before 
the annexation of Crimea, to what extent can it explain Russia’s policy? If the 
mere existence of discourse containing arguments for justifying territorial 
changes renders territorial annexations imaginable and therefore possible, 
then we could say that such discourse existed on the fringes for the most part. 
Yet the stronger claim that the dominant discourse would determine the ad-
opted policies does not hold in the Russian case since arguments for territo-
rial change were only marginal in the public discourse prior to the annexation 
of Crimea. In that sense, one could conclude that the domestic discourse in 
 Russia made the policy of the annexation of Crimea possible, but it did not 
push the Kremlin to act. There was, of course, a latent sentiment pointing to-
ward the popularity of territorial annexation as far as Crimea was concerned, 
but it did not manifest itself in the dominant public discourse (what has been 
said and argued in private can be another matter). Since the discourse relat-
ed to the principles of territorial change has not changed since 2014 either, 
 Russia’s policy could be interpreted as a response to the perceived Western 
practice of territorial integrity and borders, namely tit-for-tat after which the 
old principles of territorial integrity would apply again.
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